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Abstract 
In international relations, transnational academic exchange or, more generally, cultural ex-
change is usually seen as a function of the quality of bilateral relations. As a variety of public 
diplomacy intended to win the “hearts and minds” of intellectuals in another country, the 
development of educational exchanges depends on the twists in foreign policy. Academic 
exchange across the Taiwan Strait commenced in the late 1980s, directly after the lifting of 
the travel ban, and had gathered momentum by the mid-1990s. It even accelerated further 
after the inauguration of the pro-independence Chen-government in Taiwan in 2000, creat-
ing the “paradox” of the expansion of social contacts in times of frosty political relations. 
One possible explanation for this is that due to the rather unique situation in the Taiwan 
Strait people-to-people exchanges between Taiwan and mainland China have been officially 
promoted as a substitute for official contacts. What is often neglected by analysts of cross-
Strait relations, however, is the fact that academic exchange is also a response to the global 
pressure to internationalize higher education. Within this two-dimensional framework (in-
ternational relations and the internationalization of higher education), cross-Strait academic 
exchange has been developing its own dynamic. The outcome has been an increasing 
amount of nonofficial communication and the growing “professionalization” (in the sense of 
the academic profession) of academic exchange. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Wissenschaft zwischen Diplomatie und Exzellenz:  
Die „Akademisierung“ des taiwanisch-chinesischen Wissenschaftleraustauschs 
In den Internationalen Beziehungen wird der akademische Austausch zwischen zwei Län-
dern gewöhnlich in Abhängigkeit von der Entwicklung der bilateralen Beziehungen gese-
hen. Als Teilbereich des Kulturaustauschs und als eine Form von public diplomacy dient er 
u.a. dazu, die „Herzen und Köpfe“ der Partner auf der anderen Seite zu gewinnen. Der Aus-
tausch über die Taiwanstraße hinweg begann Ende der 1980er Jahre nach der Aufhebung 
des Reiseverbots und nahm selbst dann noch zu, als sich mit dem Amtsantritt Präsident 
Chens im Jahre 2000 die Beziehungen verschlechterten. Das heißt, auch im Falle der wissen-
schaftlichen Beziehungen ist das Paradoxon zu beobachten, dass sich die sozialen Kontakte 
trotz frostiger politischer Beziehungen stetig ausweiteten. Eine Erklärung dafür bietet die 
spezifische Situation in der Taiwanstraße, wo soziale Kontakte die fehlenden offiziellen Kon-
takte ersetzen. Aber es darf auch nicht vernachlässigt werden, dass die Ausweitung des aka-
demischen Austauschs eine Folge des globalen Drucks auf die Wissenschaften ist, exzellent 
zu sein. Beide Dimensionen – die internationalen Beziehungen und die Internationalisierung 
von Wissenschaft – verleihen der Entwicklung des taiwanisch-chinesischen wissenschaftli-
chen Austauschs eine eigene Dynamik. Sie führt zu einer Zunahme nicht offizieller Kom-
munikation und zu einer „Akademisierung“ des Austauschs. Dies kann am Beispiel der po-
litischen Wissenschaften illustriert werden, die an der Schnittstelle von Diplomatie und Wis-
senschaft tätig sind. 
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As the largest continent in the world, Asia is home to the most populous democracy as well as the 
most populous authoritarian regime. It is home to some of the most vibrant democracies as well as 
four out of the five remaining Communist countries. Asia is thus the front line in the ideological bat-
tle for the hearts and minds of the people. 
(Taiwan’s former vice president Hsiu-lien Annette Lu)2 
Economic cooperation and cultural exchange are two pillars underpinning state-to-state relations. 
Economic cooperation aims at promoting mutual benefit and win-win progress, and cultural ex-
change opens hearts and minds of peoples. 
(China’s Premier Wen Jiabao)3 
                                                     
1  This research was supported by a grant from the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD); I am especially 
grateful for the support of TFD staff members Kiel Downey and Bo Tedards. Moreover, I would like to thank 
the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University and its director, Dr. Tuan Y. Cheng, 
for their hospitality and help. I would also like to acknowledge Tang Shaocheng, Chen Chih-jou, Patrick 
Köllner and Martin Beck for their very helpful comments, and all the other people who shared their views 
with me. This paper was presented at the TFD’s seminar on April 14, 2008, and at the Sixth Conference of the 
European Association of Taiwan Studies in Madrid on April 17, 2009. 
2  Remarks at the Community of Democracies’ Taipei Roundtable on Democracy in Asia, 23.01.2007, www.presi 
dent.gov.tw/en/prog/newsrelease/documentcontent.php?id=1105498658&preid=&gcategorynumber=&category
number2=0&layer=on&subcategory=145 (retrieved 31.02.2008). 
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1 Introduction 
In 1987, when China opened its gates to “Taiwanese compatriots” and the Taiwanese gov-
ernment lifted its ban on crossing the Strait, academics were among the first groups of visi-
tors, even though travels were initially restricted to visits to relatives. Since then none of the 
politicians on either side of the Taiwan Strait has omitted the notion of expanding cultural 
and academic exchange when talking about the development of cross-Strait relations. The 
argument, rarely expressed explicitly, is that educational exchange can play an important 
role in public diplomacy because face-to-face contact, especially between opinion leaders 
and multipliers, helps to improve mutual understanding. 
In international relations, transnational academic exchange is understood as a form of scien-
tific, educational, and cultural transnational contact between the intellectual communities of 
two countries and is usually seen as a function of the quality of bilateral relations. Like cul-
ture in general, it is seen as a tool of diplomacy aimed at winning the “hearts and minds” of 
intellectuals in another country. And as a kind of public diplomacy, the development of 
educational exchange not only follows the twists and turns of foreign policy, but its specific 
use is also shaped by the intent of foreign policy. Whether it is used to one-sidedly influence 
the counterpart, to build trust through the exchange of ideas, or to achieve a common goal 
through joint projects depends to a large extent on high politics. 
In the Taiwan Strait, educational exchanges gathered momentum in 1996, when presidents 
of universities on both sides of the Strait held their first meeting to discuss higher education 
and arranged academic exchanges. They accelerated further after 2000, when the rule of the 
so-far dominant KMT (Guomindang, National Party) party ended and President Chen Shui-
bian took over in the name of the pro-independence DPP (Democratic Progressive Party, 
Minzhu Jinbu Dang). The expansion of academic exchange after 2000 seems to contradict es-
tablished knowledge: while it has continued to increase, the official relationship between 
Taiwan and China has changed for the worse in the course of an increasingly Taiwanese-
identity-oriented policy on the part of the DPP government. 
This seemingly paradox situation results from the “special” kind of relationship that exists 
between Taiwan and mainland China.4 The unresolved questions of sovereignty and secu-
rity complicate cross-Strait exchange: while China views such exchange as cooperation with-
in one country, Taiwan stresses its international character. But despite the lack of any official 
diplomatic relations, commercial and social relations have developed steadily, almost un-
tainted by the ups and downs of the political climate. Even before taking over power, the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
3  Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao at the Japanese Diet, Tokyo, 12.04.2007, http://wcm.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t31 
1107.htm (retrieved 31.02.2008). 
4  Referring to exchange between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, I will speak of “cross-Strait exchange” con-
sidering the special character of cross-Strait relations. This corresponds to the term “transnational exchange,” 
which is commonly used to differentiate relations between nonstate actors from “international” contacts at 
state level. Furthermore, I will speak of Taiwan and mainland China (or simply China) instead of the Repub-
lic of China or the People’s Republic of China since this article is not meant to clarify the status of both enti-
ties in international law. Although the use of Taiwan instead of ROC has recently been heavily contested 
within Taiwan. 
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DPP’s leaders acknowledged that it is in Taiwan’s interest to maintain friendly rather than 
confrontational relations with China. Thus the party, while pursuing Taiwan’s independ-
ence, has adopted a strategy of “separating political relations from economic interaction” 
(zhengjin fenli). In cross-Strait relations public diplomacy is less a complementary tool than it 
is a substitute for official diplomacy. 
But academic exchange is not just a policy instrument. It is carried out by academic institu-
tions and individual academics, according to their own agendas. Although mentioned by 
several authors, this “academic” part of the picture is widely neglected in their analyses. 
Over the last two to three decades transnational academic exchange has increased worldwide 
because of efforts to promote academic excellence in times of globalization. Thus reforms of 
higher education in China and Taiwan—characterized by massification, deregulation and 
marketization—have created additional incentives to expand exchange programs between 
research and teaching institutions across the Strait, be it through mutual visits, exchanges of 
students and staff, joint course delivery, research collaboration, etc. While China still restricts 
outward movement to some extent, the democratization of Taiwan’s political system as well 
as the freedom of travel and the privatization of education has stripped the Taiwanese gov-
ernment of their resources for controlling this exchange. 
This research analyzes the development of cross-Strait academic exchange using the two-
dimensional framework of bilateral relations and the internationalization of higher educa-
tion. I enquire about the actors—state and nonstate—involved in this kind of exchange and 
the dynamics of academic exchange within this framework. Why is the development of cross-
Strait academic exchange not congruent with the development of political relations? Is the in-
ternationalization of higher education subordinate to political relations or does it follow its 
own dynamic and possibly even mitigate the impact of politics on academic exchange? 
I will argue that the logic of cross-Strait policy has been compromised by the globalization of 
education. Blurring the intent that they act as public diplomats, researchers from both sides 
of the Strait have turned informational exercises into dialogical fora and have started to en-
gage in joint research projects. Increasingly fatigued with “talking politics,” they have “pro-
fessionalized” (in the sense of the academic profession) and “depoliticized” (actually “de-di-
plomatized”) cross-Strait academic exchanges over the last decade. 
The following discussion, which will illustrate the above transformation, is organized into 
three sections. In the first section I discuss the two-dimensional framework (international re-
lations and the internationalization of higher education) as well as the development of cross-
Strait relations and reforms of higher education in China and Taiwan since the middle of the 
1990s. Based on this, I provide a model of cross-Strait linkages. Then, in Section 2, I discuss 
the development of academic exchange, using the experiences of National Chengchi Univer-
sity and, in particular, political science and international relations as examples. 
This article is based upon documentary research and fieldwork. Semistructured interviews 
were carried out by the author in Taipei in March and April 2008 and—as a kind of follow-
up—in November 2008. Taking political science and international relations as a test case, the 
author took advantage of his stay at the Institute of International Relations (IIR) at National 
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Chengchi University to talk to researchers in the different divisions there. Further inter-
viewees were selected from other colleges and departments of same the university (politics, 
international law, foreign languages, education, commerce), from other universities (Na-
tional Taiwan University, Tamkang University), from government institutions, and from 
foundations. Interviews with faculty members at the NTU Hospital served as a kind of “cor-
rective” to the social science bias. 
Given the field research undertaken, my focus will be on the Taiwanese side and on Tai-
wanese researchers going to China. Though student exchange is the main quantitative com-
ponent of academic exchange, I will note it rather in the margin since students are not the 
organizers of exchanges and therefore not actors in the sense intended in this research. 
2 A Two-dimensional Framework for Cross-Strait Academic Exchange 
Academic exchange as understood in this article includes all kinds of cross-border academic 
mobility, that is, physical movements of either the consumer or the provider of education as 
well as researchers. Traditional types of mobility have been supplemented by new types of 
transnational higher education, which have become an integral part of the internationaliza-
tion of higher education (Huang 2007). These various types, however, cannot be clearly to 
differentiated and comprise forms such as cross-border supply, consumption abroad (tradi-
tional student mobility), commercial presence (e.g., the establishment of facilities in another 
country), and the provision of educational services (Altbach and Knight 2007:291 f.). Re-
searchers mainly travel for more traditional reasons; their activities range from short-term 
trips to make contacts and gather information, participation in transnational conferences, 
and lecture tours to fieldwork and joint research projects. But they are also attracted by the 
growing international market for academic personnel. 
2.1 International Relations 
Academic exchange is generally defined as a major component of foreign cultural politics. 
Thus the German government, for example, sees cultural relations as one of three foreign 
policy pillars, the other two being political and economic relations. As an instrument to pro-
tect national interests, foreign cultural politics aims at winning partners in other countries 
and creating the cultural foundations for stable international relations (Auswärtiges Amt 
2007). For Depkat, “culture is a tool of diplomacy, which can be instrumentalised to achieve 
a state’s goals in the foreign policy process” (acc. to Scott-Smith 2008:174). 
Culture can be the glue that binds civil societies, and cultural division can tear societies apart 
(Feigenbaum 2001). Exchanges allow people from different countries to get to know each 
other. Cultural or public diplomacy is “the promotion of communication between peoples as 
opposed to governments” and is designed to “build agreement based on common values.”5 
                                                     
5  F. Ninkovich: U.S. information policy and cultural diplomacy (Headline Series, No. 308 ed.) (New York, 1996):3, 
cited after Wyszomirski et al. 2003:1. 
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Ideally, it is a two-way communication process encouraged by the government. It not only 
projects a nation’s image to other countries and peoples, but also receives information from 
other countries and peoples. Because it involves nonstate actors such as nongovernmental 
organizations and private institutions—in this case universities and research institutes—it 
helps to create a global civil society. 
Foreign cultural politics can be viewed as a form of “soft power” and as an increasingly im-
portant component of a country’s international affairs toolbox. Thus in most countries it is 
primarily foreign ministries or departments which are responsible for international cultural re-
lations (Wyszomirski, et al. 2003:10 f.). Joseph S. Nye has called soft power “the second face of 
power,” which “co-opts people rather than coerces them” and “rests on the ability to shape 
the preferences of others” (Nye 2004:5). This makes it attractive to Western countries in “sell-
ing” their democracy (Aspden 2004). As a “low key confidence-building measure” it may (but 
will not necessarily) provide an eventual payoff by changing people’s mindset. With its in-
struments, foreign cultural policy aims to realize overarching values and goals, such as peace 
building, conflict prevention and human rights. Therefore, it should work hand in hand with 
foreign economic and development policy. But whether foreign cultural politics should be 
conceived of as a “security policy by different means” is still contested (Overhaus 2003). 
Like cultural exchange in general, academic communication can be seen as a kind of confi-
dence-building measure, even more so in Asia where the process is often just as important as 
the outcome (Swanström and Ledberg 2006). Countries seek to project a positive image and 
“presume that cultural capital can be used to generate social capital, and thus, foster interna-
tional trust, cooperation, and collaboration” (Wyszomirski, et al. 2003). Academic communi-
cation is a key component of the exchange of persons and ideas, and academics as well as 
academic managers are perfectly qualified to project national images. Although in this case 
Taiwan and the mainland both stem from the same cultural heritage (and language training 
is not necessary to publicize culture abroad), the national cultures have developed within dif-
ferent frameworks, which has led to different perceptions of national identity. In cross-Strait 
relations trust is totally lacking. A dialogue-based academic exchange could increase mutual 
understanding and further the building of trust through long-term relationships. 
In contrast to these rather optimistic assumptions, a more pessimistic or cautious view points 
to the necessary balance that has to be struck between the openness of academic communica-
tion and national security concerns (Vest 2006). On the one hand, access to sensitive materials 
and information has to be restricted; on the other hand, excessive controls on foreign students 
and researchers may also have unintended negative consequences on a nation’s scientific es-
tablishment. But it is not just a question of the illicit passing of information or technological 
knowledge; in general there is no guarantee that academic exchange will have a positive in-
fluence on intergovernmental relations, especially when it comes to relations between coun-
tries involved in a sharp mutual conflict (Scott-Smith 2008). 
Despite the academic results, communication between scholars does not deliver any immediate 
or measurable outcome in international relations. Academic exchange “consists to a consider-
able degree of less visible day-to-day activities among a plurality of actors” (Overhaus 2003). 
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Moreover, there is almost no measurement standard to assess the effectiveness of public di-
plomacy.6 This may be a reason why systematic studies and in-depth analyses into the impacts 
of these contacts are lacking and spillover effects are widely disputed, at least in cross-Strait re-
lations (Schucher 2005). Keng traces this lack back to the dominance of the “dyadic model,” 
that is, the focus on the interaction of two sovereign stakeholders and the inattention to sub-
state-level contacts. Responding to these limitations, other scholars have referred to integration 
theory and European experiences, but have argued from either a society-centered or a state-
centered perspective without linking “social interests” and “policy outputs” (Keng 2007). 
Actually, in contrast to the ideal concepts, cultural diplomacy is often viewed by diplomats as a 
state-centered tool. Implemented by foreign ministries, it constantly carries the risk of being 
viewed as a way to exert political pressure or propaganda. This strips public diplomacy of its 
strength to influence the environment in which opinions are formed in the long run (Gonesh 
and Melissen 2005:3 f.). Conveying information and selling a positive image of a country is part 
of its public diplomacy, but good public diplomacy has to go beyond propaganda and has to 
build long-term relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, ex-
changes, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels (Nye Jr. 2008:101 f.). 
In focusing on relationship building, public diplomacy has to be separated from propaganda 
and lobbying. Numerous scholars and practitioners have endorsed the need to move from a 
monologue- to a dialogue-based public diplomacy. Cowan and Arsenault (2008) have pointed 
to an additional third layer of engagement: collaboration, which means “initiatives in which 
participants from different nations participate in a project together” (ibid.: 21). Since each of 
these modes has particular advantages for particular situations, context is critical. They should 
be used according to time and place, either by themselves or in combination. Nevertheless, we 
can record a range of exchange activities from rather monologue-based information transfer 
through dialogue-based forms to collaborative endeavors. 
The United States’ cultural diplomacy towards the democratizing Germany after World War II 
or towards the Eastern European autocratic countries during the Cold War could serve as well-
researched examples (Lima Jr. 2007). Although the outlook of the State Department on the pur-
pose of exchanges has been relatively consistent over the past 50 years (Scott-Smith 2008), re-
cent research on US-Cuba educational exchange shows that the tool of academic exchange has 
been used in different ways (Alzugaray 2006, Lutjens 2006, Marino 2006, Martínez 2006). While 
president Clinton, for example, put his faith in people-to-people exchange as a means to bring 
change to Cuba, George W. Bush, expressing a hard-line ideological position, especially after 
9/11, strictly limited travels to the Caribbean island by students and academics in order to 
eliminate what the US government identified as “abuses of educational travel.” The overesti-
mation of the effectiveness of academic exchange has made its development dependent on the 
particular political relationship. Thus, the development of this exchange “on a more or less 
regular basis has coincided with periods of less tension in bilateral relations” (Alzugaray 2006). 
                                                     
6  “The effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured by minds changed (as shown in interviews or polls)” 
(Nye Jr. 2008:101). 
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With regard to people-to-people relations between Taiwan and mainland China, it is often 
argued that the increase in cultural exchange and social communication is well-suited to eas-
ing tensions in the Taiwan Strait.7 This, however, is probably not the chief motive of the Tai-
wanese or the Chinese governments in supporting the expansion of people-to-people con-
tacts. Presumably, a stronger reason is the hope of being able to influence opinion leaders 
and multipliers and to win the hearts and minds of the people. Both China and Taiwan have 
taken a policy-oriented approach to the concept of soft power and are trying to change 
other’s preferences through persuasion. Culture features prominently in each country’s dis-
course (Wang and Lu 2008, Wang 2008, Goldstein 2008). 
On November 2, 1987, the first “mainlander” (waishengren) allowed to cross the Strait to visit 
his hometown in China left Taiwan. In the very same year, responding to the increasing 
number of cross-Strait exchanges, the Taiwanese government had lifted the ban on main-
land visits. In 1989, China established two investment zones for Taiwanese firms and later 
passed legislation to protect Taiwanese investments on the mainland. These developments 
marked a kind of “honeymoon period” in cross-Strait relations that lasted until the middle 
of the 1990s. Among other confidence-building measures, such as the unilateral declaration 
by Taiwan in 1991 of an end to hostilities across the Strait, the establishment of Straits Ex-
change Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) as 
new communication channels had a particularly stabilizing impact. The SEF, in Taiwan, and 
the ARATS, on the mainland, were established as semiofficial institutions to handle inter-
country relations. They agreed on the formula of “one China—different interpretations” 
(yizhong gebiao) as the basis of talks. 
This consensus, however, was suspended after a series of Chinese military exercises in the 
Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996, intended to intimidate Taiwanese voters from supporting the 
pro-independence forces in the upcoming elections, and finally by President Lee Teng-hui’s 
“two states” remark (liangguolun) in July 1999. The election and inauguration of the DPP’s 
candidate Chen Shui-bian as president in 2000 together with new menacing gestures from 
Beijing heralded a period of rather frosty relations between the two governments. An infa-
mous highlight of this political downturn was certainly the adoption of the Anti-Secession 
Law by the mainland’s National People’s Congress in March 2005; however, the various 
small steps of the Chen administration towards independence, such as the de facto abolition 
of the National Unification Council in February 2006 or the referenda in 2003 and 2008, might 
also be given as examples. 
Despite deteriorating political relations accompanied by a growing advocacy of Taiwanese 
nationalism8 and policies to distract Taiwanese investors from boosting the mainland’s 
economy, cross-Strait relations in the business sector and other fields improved further after 
                                                     
7  There are myriad good publications about the development of cross-Strait relations. A very recent one cover-
ing the end of this period is Schubert and Braig 2007. 
8  This is, admittedly, a simplification of the development, since there were a couple of conciliatory mainland 
policy pronouncements by President Chen during his first term in office, starting with the “Five Noes” in his 
inaugural speech on May 20, 2000. See Schubert and Braig 2007. 
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the mid-1990s. In 2000, for example, travel restrictions were relaxed for mainlanders visiting 
Taiwan. In January 2001 the establishment of the “mini three links” allowed people to travel 
directly across the Taiwan Strait via the frontline islands, and in 2003 the first “direct” char-
ter flight was launched in conjunction with the Chinese New Year. As of September 2005, 
Taiwanese commercial planes were allowed to fly through the mainland’s airspace. 
These and other measures were implemented as a reaction to growing pressure from the 
Taiwanese business community and display a kind of discrepancy between political and 
economic or cultural relations that inspired a great deal of research on “Strait paradoxes.”9 
Whether these two opposite trends, an accommodating one and a contentious one, are 
somehow interrelated—or more precisely, whether commercial and social interests actually 
drive political integration—is so far an unresolved question. 
There is, however, no question that the Taiwanese government has been promoting people-
to-people exchange for “selling democracy” and regards the development of “people’s di-
plomacy” as an appropriate tool for broadening Taiwan’s “international space” (Rawnsley 
2003). Based on the experience gained in the years following its defeat in the civil war, the 
KMT developed a vast machinery of public diplomacy in the period after 1971, when Kiss-
inger visited mainland China. In its efforts to exploit the elements of the island’s soft power, 
the government virtually fought a “battle for world public opinion,” but its main target was 
the United States—and China (Goldstein 2008:33, 39, 42). The DPP administration has not 
only inherited this rich legacy of experience but has also doubled its efforts to include public 
diplomacy initiatives in its foreign policy (Wang and Lu 2008:444). 
The expansion of academic exchange and the internationalization of higher education are ma-
jor components of these initiatives. While academic excellence, cross-country research and 
the creation of “world class universities” are believed to enhance Taiwan’s “soft power” (and 
that of the mainland as well10), exchange is also regarded as an important tool for increasing 
the international competitiveness of Taiwan’s higher education sector. 
2.2 The Internationalization of Higher Education 
The above-mentioned example of US-Cuba educational exchange demonstrates the interde-
pendence of exchange programs and foreign policy strategies. The use of “transformational 
diplomacy” by the Bush administration, for example, curtailed academic travels and collabo-
ration to a large extent. Nevertheless, “key moments in that exchange” are also closely linked 
to the emergence and development of Cuban studies in the US (Martínez 2006). Thus, even 
following the beginning of Bush’s hostile policy “Cuban and U.S. academics have managed to 
create and maintain collaborative and respectful exchange opportunities” (Marino 2006:24). 
                                                     
9  See, for example, Bolt 2001, Clark 2003, Schucher 2005, or Kastner 2006. 
10  In the mainland’s academic debate about improving China’s cultural attractiveness indicators such as the av-
erage years of enrollment or the number of publications have been factored in by many scholars. I would like 
to thank my colleague Karsten Giese for this information. 
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Transnational cooperation in higher education is not a new phenomenon in Asia. As far back 
in time as their medieval European origins, institutions of higher education have attracted 
students and faculty from other countries and cooperated across national borders for various 
reasons, intellectual as well as economical or political (Altbach and Knight 2007:302 f.). In 
their endeavors to establish modern higher education systems in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century, Asian countries sent students and faculty members abroad for studies and re-
search. Notably, Western models of higher education have served as blueprints in China and 
Japan (Huang 2007:422). 
A rather new phenomenon is the extent of these internationalization activities. Globalization 
coupled with the massification and marketization of higher education has accelerated the 
pace of these activities and has led to a more strategic and systematic approach towards 
cross-border cooperation (Chan 2004; Mok 2007). Recent developments have been increas-
ingly driven by economic factors in a more competitive global environment, that is, by the 
transition from personal mobility and the transplantation of models to joint programs, dual 
degrees, offshore campuses, and related quality assurance at a global level. Once again, Asian 
universities are following the lead of those in Europe and North America, though with adap-
tations according to their specific needs (Yang 2001; Mok 2007; Mohrman 2008). 
Globalization is not restricted to the breakdown of national borders in international trade and 
production chains or international governance structures; it has also led—coupled with the 
rapid development of information technology—to the transformation of knowledge creation 
by bridging time and space. Internationalization as a response to globalization recognizes na-
tional boundaries and distinctiveness while trying to transcend their limitations by enhanc-
ing international understanding and cooperation. Jane Knight describes it as “the process of 
integrating an international dimension into the teaching, research and service functions of an 
institution of higher education” (Knight 1993, as cited in Knight and Wit 1995:15). This means 
that the international cooperation of universities, research institutions and researchers is an 
integral part of internationalization, conducted to increase international academic visibility 
and expand the means of knowledge creation and dissemination. 
However, there are more than just academic goals: reaching out to the international com-
munity is also intended to increase the capacity to compete in the national and global educa-
tional market. Both cooperation and competition are responses to the pressures of globaliza-
tion (Luitjen-Lub et al. 2005). The massification of higher education, the decentralization of 
governance, and commercialization have contributed to this trend to a large extent. The ex-
pansion of higher education, which had already begun in the 1960s, is the logical conse-
quence of the belief that knowledge has become the primary resource of economic progress. 
Moreover, international higher education is seen as a commodity to be freely traded. 
The proportion of young people demanding access to higher education has expanded dra-
matically worldwide. The growing number of educational institutions have to offer their 
growing student bodies, now customers of their services, new types of courses that meet the 
demands of a globalized job market—among other things, international experience. Interna-
tional education services supplement inadequate domestic capacities. Governments have 
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opened up the education sector to private investments, and global as well as local capital is 
now being invested in knowledge industries worldwide. Even though conventional higher 
education institutions still predominate in the international education landscape, they “face 
formidable increases in volume, innovation, and impact from commercial providers and 
from corporate universities” (Altbach and Knight 2007:295). 
The change in governance ideology has altered the way in which universities are managed. 
The reduction of public funding, the increase in autonomy coupled with higher expectations 
regarding research productivity and excellence, as increased evaluations of the quality of re-
search and teaching have induced a shift towards at least partial dependence on market 
sources, identified by Slaughter and Leslie as “academic capitalism” (cited after Yang 2004: 
475). Scholars must “face the market” to develop research projects, raise funds, and promote 
their departments. 
Public funding, as well as additional funding from other institutions, has become closely 
tied to the quality of performance. Alongside global publication indices, international coop-
eration has become an important performance indicator. Therefore, cooperation in all forms 
constitutes an indispensable part of the marketing and external relations strategies of all re-
search and teaching institutions. Ever more dependent on the forces of the global and mass 
higher education market, these institutions build up international alliances, arrange joint 
courses, organize academic exchanges, or agree on joint research projects. 
Evaluations of programs in various countries show that cooperation can be located on a con-
tinuum from “loose models” to close collaboration. Sometimes it simply offers an opportunity 
to exchange views. Much seems to depend on individuals (Chan 2004:37ff.). Case studies, 
however, also show a kind of strategic shift that has been taking place since the 1990s, a shift 
from the provision of opportunities to enrich academic experiences to closer and more genu-
ine academic cooperation (Chan 2004:44f.). This holds especially true for traditional nonprofit 
universities. Their main motivation to enter the international market is the wish to enhance re-
search and knowledge capacity and to increase cultural understanding. In the for-profit sector 
a key motive for internationalization is earning money (Altbach and Knight 2007). 
The fact that they are worldwide phenomena notwithstanding, the pace of these trends of 
internationalization and commercialization depends to a certain degree on national policies 
(cost calculations, visa requirements) and political realities, including national security. For 
example, fear of terrorism keeps governments on alert and affects transnational academic 
exchange, as has been alluded to above in relation to US-Cuba relations. Cross-Strait rela-
tions are likewise not free from security concerns, but restrictions are prompted less by a 
possible violent conflict than by the fear of infiltration, brain washing, or—in Taiwan—the 
flooding of universities and the job market by abundant mainland students. 
Taiwan and mainland China have both undergone higher education reforms in the last two 
decades. In response to national needs to promote economic and social development, these 
reforms have pursued the general trends of globalization: the massification of higher educa-
tion, the decentralization of governance and new forms of supervision by state organs, a 
growing role for private institutions, cutbacks in government funding, the transformation of 
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relationships with business, and internationalization. In both countries education has been 
revalued as a key factor in creating and maintaining national competitiveness in a global 
economy. Though there are different sociopolitical contexts in China and Taiwan,11 the de-
velopment of the higher education sector in both countries reveals some striking similarities 
(for the following see Mok 2000, Yang 2001, Wang 2003, Huang 2003, Lo and Chan 2006, 
Huang 2007, Pan 2007, Deem, et al. 2008; Mohrman 2008, Chou 2008, Mok and Chan 2008). 
In Taiwan, which had already cherished education as an instrument for economic develop-
ment for some time, reforms commenced in the late 1980s, when the democratization of its 
political system had begun and a sense of educational crisis emerged. In China, paramount 
leader Deng Xiaoping termed education to be one of the four ingredients of modernization 
at the beginning of his reforms, but the government’s endeavors to enhance the quality of 
higher education and research didn’t gain momentum until the 1990s. 
A quite obvious change in higher education has been the rapid increase in the number of 
students. Governments of both countries have responded to the increasing need for human 
capital as well as the demands of families (Wang 2003; Bai 2006). Taiwan’s higher education 
sector has expanded very rapidly since 1986: the number of students grew from 428,576 in 
1985 to 1.3 million in 2007. The Chinese government has been boosting the number of en-
rollments dramatically since 1999: the number of students in regular institutions of higher 
learning12 increased from 4.1 million in 1999 to 17.4 million in 2006. When private institu-
tions and institutions for continued and distance learning are included, there were 23 mil-
lion students on the mainland in 2006. This formidable expansion has been accompanied by 
a growing number of higher education institutions in Taiwan and China (Table 1). 
Table 1: Number of Higher Education Institutions and Students (1978–2007) 
 1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Taiwan  
No. of schools1) 101 104 105 121 134 150 162 163 164
No. of students 317,188 342,528 428,576 576,623 751,347 1,092,102 1,296,558 1,313,993 1,326,029
China2)  
No. of schools 598 675 1,016 1,075 1,054 1,041 1,792 1,867 1,908 
No. of students3) 856,000 1,144,000 1,703,000 2,063,000 2,906,000 5,561,000 15,618,000 17,388,000 18,849,000 
Notes: 1) Universities, colleges, junior colleges;  
2) regular institutions of higher learning;  
3) undergraduate and college students. 
Sources: MOE (TW) 2007; MOE (TW) 2008; ZTN 2008. 
                                                     
11  Mok (2000) convincingly stresses that local factors (democratization, governance philosophy, massification) 
are the driving forces for restructuring but agrees that the Taiwanese government has “skillfully shaped the 
political agendas under the policy framework of globalization.” Instead of a solely responding to globaliza-
tion it has “orchestrated” reforms (ibid.: 656). 
12  “Regular institutions of higher learning refer to educational establishments set up according to the govern-
ment evaluation and approval procedures” (ZTN 2008). They include predominantly public but also private 
institutions. 
16 Schucher: Where Minds Meet: The “Professionalization” of Cross-Strait Academic Exchange 
In order to improve university standards, the Taiwanese Ministry of Education (MOE) and 
the National Science Council (NSC) have launched some new programs since the 1990s, 
such as the Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of Universities, launched in 1998, 
and the Program for Improving University Fundamental Education, launched in 2001. These 
programs aim to improve infrastructure and facilitate research in various research fields, 
among them humanities, social sciences, life sciences, and natural sciences. 
China took a somewhat different line in the beginning. While slightly expanding enrollment 
in tertiary education, it, on the one hand, reduced the number of universities through merg-
ers in order to raise their efficiency and effectiveness and, on the other hand, concentrated 
its resources on developing and improving some selected universities. Related programs are 
“project 211” and “project 985” (launched in 1995 and 1998). They aim to upgrade the qual-
ity of teaching and research activities at key institutions and in key disciplines, not least 
through worldwide recruitment and international cooperation.13 Only since 1999 has the 
number of universities increased dramatically. 
In 1985, in order to cope with rising demand and to diversify educational services, China began 
allowing and encouraging the nonstate sector to establish educational institutions. In Taiwan, 
the number of private higher education institutions increased tremendously after the late 1980s, 
when the government abandoned limitations on opening new private establishments. The Chi-
nese Statistical Yearbook counted 1,203 private institutions of higher learning in 2007 (297 regu-
lar and 906 others) (ZTN 2008). In Taiwan the number of private universities has been con-
stantly growing since 1995—for instance, from 8 in that year to 58 in 2007. During the same pe-
riod the number of public universities rose from 16 to 42 (MOE (TW) 2008). 
China and Taiwan also shifted from the traditional ways of financing higher education by 
cutting the central government’s expenditure, shifting parts of the financial burden to local 
governments and the no-state sector, and adopting a “user-pay” principle. China imposed 
tuition fees in the late 1980s; Taiwan diversified financing channels from 1994 on. Thus stu-
dent choice became a factor in the development of educational institutions and sharpened 
competition between them while universities gained more autonomy in finance. 
In Taiwan, the MOE has assigned itself a new role as “facilitator, regulator and auditor” in-
stead of “provider.” Universities have been categorized into research, teaching, or other in-
stitutions and are funded in accordance with their respective roles. This enables the Taiwan-
ese government to steer the higher education system towards a research orientation. Cross-
university cooperation is encouraged; mergers, however, are not widely accepted. Private 
institutions have been granted total autonomy, particularly in school management. 
National universities have been turned into independent judicial entities and enjoy a high 
degree of flexibility and autonomy in their operations. The cutbacks in public financing and 
a new budget system provide incentives to diversify income sources and apply for research 
grants. Universities have to assume responsibility for some 20 to 30 percent of their annual 
                                                     
13  Among the top universities that were selected to profit from intensive funding are Beijing University and 
Qinghua University. 
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budget. The autonomy of public institutions, however, is not universal. The MOE still has 
the final say in installing presidents and deans (Mok 2000:650 f.). Moreover, there remain re-
strictions when it comes to cross-Strait relations. 
Following the worldwide trend in its reforms, the Chinese government likewise shifted from 
control to supervision and transferred the leadership of numerous universities from central 
ministries to provincial and local governments. Decentralization made education to a large 
extent dependent on local resources and induced rising inequality, which was deliberately 
amplified by the programs to promote the excellence of some selected universities. In order 
to increase income, Chinese universities established enterprises, not always related to their 
educational mission, and looked for additional revenue by initiating outreach activities. In 
general, the autonomy of universities with regard to academic issues has increased, but is-
sues such as enrollment quotas and faculty size or the appointment of leading personnel are 
still determined by the MOE, though with negotiation (Mohrman 2008:32 f.). 
In both countries, peer-evaluation systems are playing an ever more important role. Univer-
sities’ success is measured with indicators such as international agreements or the hosting of 
international conferences. Individual researchers face a great deal of pressure to participate 
in international conferences and to publish in SSCI or SCI journals. In addition, Taiwan has 
established the Taiwan SSCI to encompass local publications, but the credit granted is con-
siderably lower (3 instead of 5 points at Chengchi University). 
In its desire to foster internationally competitive universities, China has expanded its par-
ticipation in international collaboration and exchange since the 1990s. This has led to an in-
crease in overseas studies and study tours by academics, as well as administrators from uni-
versities and the state bureaucracy, and to the opening up of China’s education sector to for-
eign scholars, curricular models, and institutions.14 Faced with limited resources and mas-
sive brain drain, China’s goal is to provide Chinese students and scholars with facilities of 
an international standard—to have “overseas studies within the country” (bu chuguo liuxue). 
For 2002, one year before a regulation on Sino-foreign cooperation in the joint operation of 
educational establishments became effective in September 2003, the Chinese MOE lists 712 
joint projects, 225 of them in the formal higher education sector. Apart from language train-
ing, which reigns supreme in bilateral cooperation, most of these projects fall within the ar-
eas of business and administration (36 percent), electronic information (13 percent) and eco-
nomics (10 percent); 31 programs are jointly run with Taiwan (which ranks in eighth place 
among the cooperation partners) (MOE (CH) 2003). 
In Taiwan, the expansion of academic exchange is regarded as an important tool in raising 
the international competitiveness of the country’s higher education sector. Other tools in-
clude—according to an MOE plan of August 2002—sending students for international ex-
changes, encouraging them to learn foreign languages, and adopting English as a medium 
of instruction. The mainland’s internationalization activities seem to be a strong incentive to 
grow academic exchange (see, e.g., Gaojiao jianxun 2005; Chen and Lai 2007). 
                                                     
14  See the case study on internationalization at the South China University of Technology (Yang 2004). 
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Aware of the importance of international positioning, China and Taiwan have attached con-
siderable weight to university rankings, both national and international. In 2004, Taiwan’s 
Executive Yuan set the target of developing at least one local university to become one of the 
top 100 universities within the next decade. 
There are also critics of internationalization, some of whom deprecate the “mimicry” of 
Western models as a new form of imperialism in education (Mok 2007). Pleas for localiza-
tion were encouraged in Taiwan through the government’s policy of De-Sinicization (Yang 
2001). Both Taiwan and China have, however, already left the stage of the “Import-Oriented 
Type” in transnational higher education and are making great efforts to export their own 
services (Huang 2007). 
2.3 Actors in Transnational Academic Exchange 
Public diplomacy and the internationalization of higher education are the two dimensions 
that frame academic exchange. While public diplomacy consists of the three layers of mono-
logue, dialogue and collaboration, internationalization activities range from loose contacts 
and the rather one-sided presentation of views through dialogic forms such as discussion 
fora to closer and more genuine academic cooperation. In addition to different state agen-
cies, actors can be found throughout the whole of academia, from institutions (foundations, 
universities and colleges) to individual researchers (Figure 1). Their motives in carrying out 
transnational academic exchange relate to international relations, the internationalization of 
higher education, and commercial interests. 
Referring to Keng (2007) and Yung Wei’s concept of “linkage communities” (Wei 1997), I 
differentiate between the systemic, which means the global level, the state level, and the 
community level. The notion of “community” is here related rather to “scientific communi-
ties” in general, but it also resembles Haas’ “epistemic communities,”—that is, networks of 
professionals “with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an au-
thoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain” or “a concrete collection 
of individuals who share the same worldview (or episteme)” (Haas 1992:3, 27). As a type of 
“opinion leader,” academics are also targets for a politically motivated, policy-orientated ex-
change program as they are actors in transnational exchange following their own academic 
interests (Scott-Smith 2008:186 f.). 
Speaking of actors, however, and not of “variables” like Keng, I see both levels, state and 
community, as being linked to each other. Thus there is no clear-cut separation between “of-
ficial relations” at the state level and “nonofficial relations” at the community level, but 
rather a kind of continuum ranging from the state to the community level. Official relations 
are by no means restricted to the state level, since universities, departments, and not least in-
dividual researchers establish official relations with their counterparts—within the frame-
work of the internationalization of higher education, that is, under the auspices of state insti-
tutions. Nevertheless, nonofficial relations are more likely to be found at the “lower” range of 
the community level, where researchers are the least exposed to state-level intervention. Offi-
cial as well as nonofficial relations take place within the international context. 
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Figure 1: Actors and Agendas in Transnational Academic Exchange 
 
Note: HE = higher education. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
3 Cross-Strait Academic Exchange 
Cross-Strait academic exchange is an important component of cross-Strait public diplomacy. 
Political leaders on both sides have reiterated their intention to promote this kind of ex-
change time and again, but only since the inauguration of the new KMT government under 
President Ma have both sides included the expansion of cultural and academic exchange in 
their expectations of better relations in future. 
Academic exchange with China is, however, different from that between Taiwan and other 
countries. The “special” conditions of political relations also shape the conditions of exchange 
and lead to political interference and bureaucratic restrictions. Different systems and differ-
ent politics on both sides result in a formidable imbalance in mutual visits, with Taiwanese 
institutions and people being much more active. On the other hand, the cultural proximity 
and the common language facilitate the making of contacts as compared to exchanges with 
other countries. Thus in some cases contacts with China are the first choice, although rela-
tions with academic institutions in foreign countries might have a higher value added. 
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3.1 The Policy of Cross-Strait Academic Exchange 
The popularity of public diplomacy is a result of the growing awareness among state actors 
that foreign relations can no longer be left to diplomats alone. This also holds true for China 
and Taiwan. “People-to-people diplomacy” and “soft power” approaches are seen to be ef-
fective ways of influencing people on the opposite side of the Strait. The Taiwanese gov-
ernment welcomes the fact that 
the range of cross-strait exchange activities has been extended gradually from academics 
to art, culture, science, technology, sports, and the mass media. The depth of these ex-
changes has also expanded from visits and seminars to the exchange of publications, co-
operative research, learning opportunities, and teaching and training. Visitors from the 
Chinese mainland now include professionals and officials from cultural and educational 
fields, members of the mass media, and those in religious circles. Experts in the fields of 
science and technology are allowed to visit for research, and those engaged in Chinese art 
and folk art are permitted to teach. 
Consequently, the government 
encourages people-to-people exchanges between the two sides, and various cultural and 
educational institutions have subsidized private groups for such activities. In addition, 
the Mainland Affairs Council, in January 1994, established the only institute that subsi-
dizes cross-strait exchanges, the Chinese Development Fund, which provides financial 
aid from the interest the fund generates. Support has also been provided for visits by out-
standing individuals, research by graduate students, lectures or research by scholars, and 
for publishing works by mainland scholars.15 
Chinese politicians judge advances in cross-Strait exchange and cooperation as a new “win-
win” situation. Relations with Taiwan have 
entered a new stage that can bring tremendous benefits to the people across the Straits. 
Currently, cross-Strait exchanges and contacts are being carried out in an all-round way 
from culture to economy, cross-Strait industrial and business circles are hand-in-hand fac-
ing the international market, on the basis of ties by blood, ancestor and culture, the Chinese 
across the Straits are jointly facing the new challenge brought about by the new economy.16 
Not only in Taiwan but also in China an increasing number of individuals and groups have 
begun to participate in transnational networks. The general understanding of public diplo-
macy, however, is still characterized by the state-centered approach, although political lead-
ers on both sides stress the importance of civic associations. 
                                                     
15  Government Information Office. Online: www.gio.gov.tw/info/taiwan-story/culture/edown/3-4.htm [retrieved 
20.02.2007]. 
16  “Commentary: Cultural Ties Hard to Sever, Frequent Cross-Strait Visits Encouraged.” People’s Daily Online, 
01.04.2002. 
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From the very start of cross-Strait personal contacts in 1987 until the present, both sides have 
consistently expressed their willingness to promote people-to-people exchange, including 
visits by academics.17 On January 30, 1989, Ding Guangen, director of the Taiwan Affairs Of-
fice of the Chinese State Council, discussing Taiwanese affairs in a meeting with journalists, 
said Taiwanese affairs would be promoted in the following three ways: (1) focusing on 
economy and trade with Taiwan; (2) improving arrangements for receiving compatriots 
from Taiwan; and (3) promoting academic, cultural, sports, and technological exchanges be-
tween the two sides of the Strait. In Taiwan, newly appointed President Lee Teng-hui 
stressed the following in his inaugural speech of May 20, 1990: 
If mainland authorities can adopt democracy and a free market system, renounce the use of 
force in the Taiwan Strait, and not interfere in our pursuit of foreign relations under the one-
China premise, we will be willing to establish communication channels on equal footing to 
fully open up economic, academic, cultural, scientific, technological and other exchanges. 
Ever since, all Chinese as well as Taiwanese leaders have echoed these views. While incum-
bent Chinese state president Hu Jintao still refers to the “eight points”—submitted by his 
predecessor Jiang Zemin on January 30, 1995 in a speech titled “Continue to promote the re-
unification of the motherland” (Jiang 1995) and serving as the foundation of reunification 
policy since then—Taiwan’s former president Chen Shui-bian put forward several different 
ideas on the relations between the two sides. Nevertheless, in line with the DPP’s functional 
separation of political relations and economic and social interactions (Wang 2000), the pro-
motion of cross-Strait cultural and academic relations never ceased to be an inherent part of 
his China policy.18 “Soon after taking office, the DPP instituted a wide-ranging programme 
under the rubric of ‘people’s diplomacy’ (quan renmin waijiao)” (Goldstein 2008:43). 
The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) has adopted a gradual approach to the implementation 
of people-to-people exchanges. By 2007, more than 140 measures to expand exchanges had 
been passed, covering the entire range of activities, and each measure represents another step 
forward in cross-Strait relations. Figures on personal contacts, trade, investment, posts, and 
telecommunications indicate how people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait have outpaced ties with other countries around the world (MAC 2007). 
The document “Principles for Implementing Cross-strait Cultural Exchanges at the Current 
Stage,” adopted by the MAC on January 31, 1994, states that the organization will “encour-
age scholars in various academic fields and professionals in scientific and technological 
fields to exchange visits, attend seminars, do research, and give lectures to improve the aca-
demic levels of the two sides. Those whose specialties may help social modernization, disas-
ter prevention, environmental protection, and other subject matters related to people’s live-
lihood shall be given priority” (MAC 1994). 
                                                     
17  Unless indicated otherwise, source of information is MAC 2008. 
18  See, for example, Chen’s inaugural address from 2004: “Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan.” www.gio. 
gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-pg/pi2004/. See also the DPP’s “White Paper on Foreign Policy for the 21st Century” 
(www.taiwandc.org/dpp-pol3.htm), issued during the presidential election of 1999/2000, and Vice President 
Lu’s book Soft Power: Vision for a New Era, Taipei 2006. 
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While these “principles” insinuate that genuine academic research has been taken into ac-
count by decision makers, most of the statements of both sides reveal the disregard for aca-
demic communication and the preponderance of political intentions. China wants to “work 
hard with Taiwan compatriots” in order to “deter ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist activi-
ties” and to promote “peaceful unification.” Taiwanese politicians consider cultural and 
academic links to be a “practical issue” to start with on the multistage path towards a “final 
settlement” of the political differences between the two sides. Precisely because of the ab-
sence of official relations, both sides encourage personal contacts—even more so when the 
political situation turns sour. 
Thus in the Anti-Secession Law of March 2005, which threatens to incorporate Taiwan into 
China by military force, article six deals with cross-Strait relations. It states that in order to 
maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and to foster cross-Strait relations, the State 
should (1) encourage people-to-people contact to foster closer relations and understanding, 
(2) encourage cross-Strait economic exchange, (3) encourage scientific and cultural exchanges, 
(4) encourage joint efforts to fight crime, and (5) encourage efforts to maintain peace and sta-
bility in the Taiwan Strait (NPC 2005). 
Shortly after the law was passed, in a kind of answer, the MAC commented on its “policy 
for cross-strait exchanges.” MAC deplored the fact that “frequent cross-strait interaction in 
economic, trade, social, cultural, and educational areas has often been offset by political and 
military standoffs.” It also stated that since “China uses cross-strait exchanges for its own 
political gain, Taiwan feels compelled to evaluate the rate and scale of bilateral exchanges in 
order to safeguard social stability and national security.” Nevertheless, it stated that “cul-
tural and educational exchanges come foremost in cross-strait relations” (MAC 2005). 
Since both sides are well informed about the intentions of the other side, the outcome is a justi-
fied mutual mistrust. Taiwan accuses China of utilizing youth exchanges—in pursuing united 
front tactics—for “political contamination” and to send Chinese officials disguised as special-
ists. China itself fears that its own students will also be “polluted” once sent to Taiwanese uni-
versities. Mistrust leads to policy interference and bureaucratic restrictions, be it on the joint 
publication of books, student exchanges, the duration of research stays, or the visits of scholars-
turned-officials. Especially contentious—and even an issue in the presidential election cam-
paign in March 2008—are restrictions on Chinese students studying in Taiwan19 and the non-
recognition of educational credentials from Chinese universities,20 not least because these could 
negatively affect efforts to internationalize the Taiwanese higher education sector.21 
Nevertheless, political leaders on both sides have had high expectations of cultural and aca-
demic exchange. In December 2004, for example, then MAC chairman Joseph Wu proposed 
an academic confidence building mechanism: Both governments would appoint an out-
                                                     
19  Tso (2007) elaborates that restrictions on Chinese students are also contended within the DPP-government. 
20  The number of Taiwanese students enrolled in universities in China reached 339 in 2006. Since September 
2005 they have enjoyed the same treatment as Chinese students. In total, more than 7,000 Taiwanese students 
had studied on the mainland as of August 2006 (Xinhua News Agency, 05.08.2006). 
21  Chang, of the Bureau of International Cultural, Educational Relations, does not even mention China in his art-
icle on internationalization (Chang 2006). 
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standing scholar of law and politics or international relations to be stationed on a long-term 
basis on the other side. After notifying the other side through the existing channels, the ap-
pointed scholars would engage in an in-depth investigation and study, as well as write a re-
port which could be confidentially transmitted back to their own government to serve as a 
reference regarding the other government’s administration. The scholars appointed by each 
government could, with authorization, act as a bridge for the exchange of information be-
tween both governments. 
Once again, this proposal reveals the state-centered approach toward public diplomacy in 
general and academic exchange in particular. Academic exchange is meant to substitute dip-
lomatic relations and to produce and gather information, not to organize a two-directional 
professional dialogue. Academic visitor groups have often served as a cover for academics-
turned-diplomats to visit the other side outside the nonexistent official diplomatic channels. 
This has meant, at least during the Chen Presidency, that public diplomacy has been re-
duced to state-centered and rather hierarchical forms, to a diplomacy of publics not by pub-
lics (for the two forms, hierarchical vs. network, see Hocking 2005). Taiwanese academics do 
not complain that Chen restricted contacts, but rather that he did not care about academic 
expertise in public diplomacy (personal interviews). Only after the inauguration of Presi-
dent Ma has academic exchange been officially promoted as a means of discussing the 
whole range of bilateral issues. 
3.2 State-centered Public Diplomacy and Actors in Academic Exchange 
While the official view on public diplomacy and the role of academics reveal a high degree 
of state-centrism, nonstate institutions and private citizens are the main actors in cross-Strait 
communication. Institutional arrangements are, however, somewhat blurred because of the 
“special” conditions of cross-Strait relations. This holds true not only for China, which offi-
cially views Taiwan as a Chinese province and therefore believes that relations should be 
placed within the domestic institutional framework, but also for Taiwan, the political elite of 
which still struggles with the exact definition of a possible “statehood.” Chengchi Univer-
sity, for example, has transferred its relations with China to the China Study Centre instead 
of keeping them with the Centre of International Education and Exchange [author’s italics]. 
At the government level, dealing with cross-Strait affairs seems to be a minor problem for 
functional ministries, such as the Ministry of Education, but is a real head-scratcher when it 
comes to defining their place in the foreign affairs realm.22 Chinese public diplomacy activi-
ties are generally reserved for the Office of Foreign Propaganda of the CCP and the State 
Council Information Office. A third player is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although non-
state actors are growing in number and room for nonstate exchange including academic ex-
                                                     
22  This may be one reason that hard facts on academic exchange are quite scarce, at least in the public domain. 
The Chinese MOE, for example, normally lists relations with Taiwan under a separate headline: “Coopera-
tion and Exchange with SAR Hong Kong and Macao and Taiwan area”. In 2003, however, it referred to Tai-
wan in a contribution on “Sino-Foreign Cooperation and Exchange.” 
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change is expanding, these actors are not fully independent (d'Hooghe 2007). In Taiwan, 
public diplomacy is strongly promoted by the presidential office and pursued by the Gov-
ernment Information Office (GIO) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).23 
In order to handle China affairs, the Taiwanese government established the Mainland Af-
fairs Council (MAC) under the auspices of the Executive Yuan, its Chinese counterpart be-
ing the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (TAO). The MAC’s tasks are, among oth-
ers, planning and researching policies towards China, enacting laws and regulations govern-
ing cross-Strait relations, promoting cultural and educational exchange, and informing the 
public about cross-Strait policy. 
In order to encourage cross-Strait civilian exchanges, the MAC established the Chinese De-
velopment Fund (CDF) as a nonprofit fund in January 1994. The CDF plans and promotes 
exchanges in accordance with the following three major policy objectives: to increase cross-
Strait cultural and educational exchanges and cooperation, to help mainland professionals 
better understand Taiwan, and to improve cross-Strait information dissemination. Projects 
include sponsoring professionals and graduate students from Taiwan and the mainland to 
teach or do research on the other side, organizing forums and workshops for young scholars 
and students from both sides of the Strait, assisting mainland nationals to publish their aca-
demic works in Taiwan, and offering financial assistance for Taiwanese academic works 
published on the mainland (CDF 2007). 
The National Science Council (NSC) of the Executive Yuan was established in 1959. Led by a 
minister, the council is presently the highest government agency responsible for promoting the 
development of science and technology. In order to encourage scientific interchange between 
sci-tech personnel on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the NSC has taken the following steps: 
funding key researchers from the mainland for short-term visits to Taiwan, recruiting mainland 
Chinese scientists to conduct research in Taiwan, providing funding for Taiwanese scholars 
and specialists to visit the mainland for short-term scientific research, and sponsoring sci-tech 
conferences for participants from both sides of the Taiwan Strait (http://web.nsc.gov.tw). 
In view of the necessity of relying on nonofficial relations, the Taiwanese government has 
developed a broad range of (public) diplomatic methods (see Larus 2006:45-48). “Inter-
parliamentary diplomacy” plays an important role in relations with other democratic coun-
tries, as do nongovernmental organizations such as the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy 
(TFD) (see Wang and Lu 2008, Goldstein 2008). In the eyes of government institutions, foun-
dations also seem to be a proper way to develop cross-Strait relations. Two quite active 
foundations are the Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies (FICS) and the 
Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation (Box 1). 
Both foundations maintain close links to government institutions such as the National Secu-
rity Bureau. To accomplish their above-mentioned objectives, the foundations (co)sponsor 
conferences; invite scholars and other guests to visit Taiwan; and assist Taiwanese scholars 
                                                     
23  The latter convened, for example, a Forum on Taiwan’s public diplomacy on Dec. 24, 2007 (Hsu 2008). 
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and experts to visit universities, research centers and think tanks on the mainland.24 Accord-
ing to a survey among China study specialists performed by Chen and Chen, the funding 
sources for exchange activities are, in order of importance, CDF (81 percent of respondents), 
NSC (32 percent), nonprofit organizations (24 percent), MOE (17 percent), and universities 
(10 percent). The importance of private funding is said to be increasing (Chen and Chen 
2005:67 f.). Chen Chih-jou’s analysis confirms the prominent role of foundations: they rank 
second after universities in inviting mainland scholars (Chen 2008:6 f.)25. 
Box 1: Foundations 
Founded in 1994, the Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies (formerly the Chinese Eurasian 
Foundation) is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution dedicated to public policy analysis and 
impact. Initiated by elites in public and nonpublic sectors, business executives, and academics, the founda-
tion is committed to being a leading think tank in the R.O.C. (Taiwan). Its primary missions are 
• to raise public awareness of national security interests; 
• to provide policy options for government and private sectors; 
• to enhance studies in the areas of Europe, the Americas, and Asia-Pacific; 
• to promote understanding across the Taiwan Strait;  
• and to sponsor international exchanges and collaborations. 
The Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation, a private, nonprofit research organization, was founded on 
the March 3, 1997 in the R.O.C. (Taiwan). Strictly nonpartisan, the foundation enjoys academic and adminis-
trative independence. 
The foundation is dedicated to providing its clients—government agencies, private enterprises, and aca-
demic institutes—with pragmatic and comprehensive policy analyses on critical current issues in the areas of 
cross-Strait relations, foreign policy, national security, international relations, strategic studies, and interna-
tional business. The foundation aims to serve as a research center linking government agencies, private en-
terprises, and academic institutions in terms of information integration and policy analysis. 
Source: www.fics.org.tw/; www.pf.org.tw/. 
The state-centered approach of both Taiwan and China has caused the two governments to 
mistakenly turn public diplomacy, theoretically conceived of as a two-way communication 
process, into a propaganda tool. In China, public diplomacy, initially designed with the help 
of PR –consultants, is still understood as a means of boosting the legitimacy of the Commu-
nist Party and redressing negative images (d'Hooghe 2007). It is mainly designed as a one-
directional influence on target groups in other countries, though increasingly by involving 
social groups. A growing awareness of the negative connotation of the notion of “propa-
ganda” (xuanchuan) has prompted China to change its terminology and use the term “in-
formation” (xinxi) instead.26 
                                                     
24  The FICS, however, was banned by the mainland from organizing cross-Strait activities after Ching Cheong 
(Chéng Xiáng), a senior journalist with The Straits Times, was detained by the People’s Republic of China for al-
leged espionage and accused of providing state secrets to Taiwan in April 2005. FICS was accused of financing him. 
25  I would like to thank Dr. Chen for giving me a copy of his article, which was published in a book by the 
Mainland Affairs Council. 
26  I would like to thank my colleague Karsten Giese for this information. 
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The mainland’s conception of public diplomacy is reflected in the Taiwanese fear of Chinese 
“united front activities” towards Taiwanese students and scholars. A paper about these ac-
tivities on the website of the Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies lists 
summer and winter camps; sightseeing trips; the establishment of friendly relationships; 
and academic exchanges involving not only scholars but also more and more graduate and 
postgraduate students in workshops, visits, and study trips. Workshops mostly deal with 
cross-Strait relations in the fields of culture, education, or arts; the academic quality of study 
trips, however, is said to be low and political propaganda prevalent (Huang 2007). 
The Taiwanese government seems to be focused on “selling democracy” by making use of 
mainly government-sponsored foundations.27 This approach narrows academic exchange to 
group visits and conferences, which are certainly useful for academics in many ways, but 
are only one step in the direction of substantial academic cooperation. Moreover, this ap-
proach causes political decision makers to neglect academic communication below the state 
level. Referring to Figure 1 above, I will therefore differentiate between government-spon-
sored nonofficial relations and non-government-sponsored nonofficial relations. 
Encouraged by the government, foundations and professional associations organize confer-
ences and visits in order to promote academic exchange. Conferences seem to be the main 
activity in cross-Strait academic exchange.28 Sometimes organized simply for the purpose of 
having a conference, this institution is prone to being a formal exercise. Nevertheless, com-
munication and contacts between academics and the building of social capital might be the 
(un)intended consequence. 
Even in China, there is a growing engagement of “unofficial” players, a development that—
though promoted by the government—is partially a bottom-up process. The government re-
alizes that it needs the knowledge and expertise of other groups in society (d'Hooghe 2007: 
11 f.). By making room for these new forms of diplomacy, the Chinese and Taiwanese gov-
ernments open up active and multilayered channels between themselves and epistemic 
communities. Types of policy mechanisms include closed-door consultations with policy 
makers, internal reports, policy papers, conferences, public policy debates, and the like. 
With the relaxation in the Taiwan Strait under President Ma and the sidelining of the prob-
lem of sovereignty, both sides are showing increasing interest in the resolution of concrete 
issues, the most pressing being the question of financial tradeoffs due to the global economic 
crisis (Ko 2008). In order for this to be successful, technical knowledge is needed, and aca-
demics have been drawn on in many ways: as providers of expertise, as participants in 
workshops and seminars, etc. At least for the time being, academic exchange has largely 
been assigned greater value. 
                                                     
27  “President-elect Ma Ying-jeou said in an interview that he does not advocate ‘directly exporting democracy’ 
to China, adding that by increasing cross-strait interaction, the merits of democracy would ‘naturally’ lead to 
positive changes in China” (Taipei Times, 07.04.2008). 
28  Mainland statistics show that 35 percent of all projects coming to China in 2006 were “international confer-
ences,” 31 percent “field trips,” and only 9 percent “cooperative research.” www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/qtsj/zgkjtjnj/ 
2006/t20071204402449363.htm (retrieved 15.03.2008). 
Schucher: Where Minds Meet: The “Professionalization” of Cross-Strait Academic Exchange 27 
Reforms of higher education, however, could encroach upon this interaction. Paying close 
attention to international academic ranking systems, university and college administrations 
strongly encourage researchers to publish in peer-reviewed journals, present papers at aca-
demic conferences with good reputations, and seek funded research projects—if possible in 
collaboration with colleagues abroad. To enforce the achievement of these objectives, regular 
evaluations by peer groups are conducted to check on research plans, projects, and results. 
Depending on the discipline, Taiwanese researchers can use their contacts and trips to the 
mainland to raise their standing in evaluations. Without any language problems, any Tai-
wanese researcher is able to document his “internationalization” through his participation in 
international conferences, terms as visiting scholars, field trips, and the like. Cross-Strait and 
China studies are particularly able to cash in on their extended relations with the mainland. 
With no alternative other than to cave in to the pressure to be excellent, even policy-oriented 
institutes such as the IIR have had to set specifications for their staff that include a certain 
quota of peer-reviewed articles (three within two years at the IIR) and the attraction of re-
search grants. In following these excellence-oriented incentives, however, staff members are 
less inclined to fulfill their policy-oriented tasks, as the IIR director complained. Thus, even 
an institution such as the IIR, which has been highly renowned for its policy-orientation for 
decades, provides an example of the academic “professionalization” of cross-Strait academic 
exchange (see 3.5). 
3.3 Obstacles: Nation Branding and Security Issues 
Public diplomacy requires a common image and value platform within a country in order to 
enable the coordination of state and nonstate actors’ activities. This image has to be created 
using modes of domestic communication and network building. It is not possible in a de-
mocratic country to steer societal actors at home, at least not on the basis of orders. Improv-
ing the nation’s image is closely related to nation branding and to identity building. “The 
idea behind a nation-brand is to create a distinguishing name and/or symbol that is intended 
to differentiate one country from another” (Gonesh and Melissen 2005:17 f.). 
Nation branding, however, represents a tremendous stumbling block in cross-Strait rela-
tions. While the Taiwanese government, especially during the eight years of the Chen Shui-
bian presidency, has been trying to establish a new national identity and culture distinctive 
from that of mainland China, the mainland’s government has stressed the unity and the 
common culture of a China that includes Taiwan. Chen’s identity policy has been perceived 
as a threat to national unity by the mainland. The mainland scholars Wang and Liu, for ex-
ample, argue that Taiwan’s people-to-people-diplomacy will only be successful in opening 
space for exchange when it accepts the “one –China” principle (Wang and Liu 2003). Recip-
rocally, China’s stance of advocating commonalities with Taiwanese “compatriots” has been 
perceived by the island’s scholars as a threat to Taiwanese sovereignty.29 
                                                     
29  According to Tsang, expanding exchanges between Taiwan and China have helped to forge a common iden-
tity among the people of Taiwan, one that is in contrast to the citizens of China (Tsang 2007:186). 
28 Schucher: Where Minds Meet: The “Professionalization” of Cross-Strait Academic Exchange 
Yet regardless of ideological preferences, when Taiwan’s former president Chen used soft 
power too transparently as a means of achieving his goal of independence, the influence of 
Taiwan’s soft power was clearly reduced (Goldstein 2008: 49 f.). His drive for de-Sinicization 
was also reflected in his attempts to change the term R.O.C. into Taiwan (in textbooks, 
documents, and the names of national institutions). Despite this rather recent development—
which has since been reversed by the KMT government—“‘names” have been a problem in 
cross-Strait relations from the very start. On the occasion of Beijing University’s one hun-
dredth anniversary, for example, the president of the Taiwanese Academia Sinica was named 
as “laizi Taiwansheng de daxue xiaozhang” (university president coming from Taiwan prov-
ince). The journalist reporting rightly asked if it is not a contradiction to speak of “academic 
exchange” on the one hand but of “guonei guanxi” (internal relations) and ”Zhongguo.Taibei” 
(China.Taipei) on the other hand (Zhongguo Shibao, 04.05.1998). 
Many institutions in Taiwan have kept or adopted the names of the mainland organizations 
from which they claim have their roots, for instance, the Academia Sinica or Tsinghua Uni-
versity. Other public universities bear the word “guoli” (national) in their names, a red rag to 
Beijing. This presents very practical problems for agreements, joint projects, or joint publica-
tions. For legitimate reasons universities and colleges are obliged to insist on proper names 
and to use the “right” characters (zhengtizi) when signing contracts or agreements with 
mainland counterparts. 
Somewhat more complicated is the question of the nonrecognition of mainland universities’ 
degrees and diplomas. Arguments against recognition range from the quality of education, 
logistics, laws, and regulations to ramifications for the labor market. The main concerns 
seem to be market related, for instance, the allocation of educational resources and possible 
consequences for Taiwanese vocational high schools, which could face the threat of closure 
with more and more students heading to the mainland. There are also considerations re-
garding national security, as former president Chen declared on various occasions (Taipei 
Times, 22.07.2007). 
Legal problems such as the nonrecognition of degrees in combination with political interfer-
ence have created an atmosphere that places practical obstacles in the way of increasing aca-
demic exchange. The duration of stays for mainland scientists in Taiwan is limited by the 
mainland (permits are often only granted for one year) as well as Taiwanese regulations (three 
years since 2003); the hiring of mainland scholars by Taiwanese universities is forbidden; and 
the mainland’s visiting scholars are not issued with passports, which prevents them from at-
tending conferences outside Taiwan (nature 2000; nature 2001; China.com 2003). The mainland 
also denies consent for the participation of mainlanders in international conferences in Taiwan, 
but does not object to the joint participation of mainland and Taiwanese scholars in conferences 
in China or abroad. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, in “sensitive times,” such as during elections in Taiwan, travel 
permits are temporarily withheld or even not granted at all by mainland authorities. “Sensi-
tive” persons such as dissidents on the mainland, high-ranking politicians on both sides, or 
Taiwanese academics noted for their unvarnished political sympathies for reunification are of-
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ten refused travel permits by their respective governments. Nevertheless, utilizing academic 
exchange as a second track is a common way of making contacts. Thus, politicians from both 
sides—often academics themselves—participate in delegations (called “white gloves” [baishou-
tao] in Taiwan). Whether restrictions are imposed or not depends to a large degree, however, 
on the actual political situation.30 
With the expansion of cross-Strait exchange, brain drain has become a problem for Taiwan. 
According to Sung Kuo-cheng, the “worst part of the brain drain is the flight of top-level re-
searchers in biochemistry, medicine, computer science, DNA engineering and aviation ma-
terials.” The relaxation of a ban to allow Taiwanese to practice medicine in China on short-
term contracts has further encouraged people to cross the Strait (Strait Times, 07.01.2008). To 
a minor extent, specialists in law or commercial studies are also welcomed. China.com esti-
mates that most of the trips of Taiwanese scholars to the mainland are for “visits,” confer-
ences, and scientific fairs, while authentic joint research only accounts for approximately 10 
percent of trips. There are, however, an increasing number of Taiwanese specialists working 
for Taiwanese and mainland companies in China, not least because of the worsening eco-
nomic situation in Taiwan (China.com 2003). 
3.4 Cross-Strait Academic Exchange and the Development of Political Relations 
Assessing the quantitative development of cross-Strait academic exchange is as tricky as de-
termining the reasons for it. These could have rather contradictory effects: if the develop-
ment of academic exchange coincides with the development of bilateral relations it would 
have declined during the Chen presidency, but if it depends on the global pressure to inter-
nationalize higher education it would have increased. If academic exchange is conceived of 
as a tool of propaganda, it would be cultivated even when official relations deteriorate, but 
if it is judged to be a gateway for hostile influence, it would be reduced. 
Unfortunately, we do not have enough information about the quantitative development of 
academic exchange.31 Figures on Taiwanese scholars going to China are scarce. The reason is 
not only the peculiarities of cross-Strait exchange, but also, and mainly, the relaxation of 
travel regulations. It is not possible to count the trips made by academics without govern-
ment sponsorship, be they tourism or professional trips.32 Thus we only have scattered in-
formation from the Chinese MOE, which refers to the government-sponsored nonofficial 
contacts, as well as information on visits by Taiwanese citizens in general (see Table 2). 
Overall, the visits are largely asymmetrical since there are many more visits by Taiwanese 
people to the mainland than vice versa. The main reason is certainly the different extent of 
restrictions on each side. 
                                                     
30  In 2005, for example, the application of the TAO’s then director Chen Yunlin to visit Taiwan as a civic scholar 
was heavily contested and finally rejected (MAC 2008). 
31  This is also bewailed by Taiwanese authors, see Chen n.d. 
32  Institutes, colleges, and universities might have more detailed information, since researchers are bound to no-
tify their superiors in order to get permission for their “business” trips and to enjoy insurance protection. But 
not everybody gives notice of his or her trips, especially of short trips (personal interviews). 
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Table 2: Visits and Academic Exchange, Taiwan to China, 1992–2007 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Visits (billion) 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.6 3.1 3.4 3.7 2.7 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.6
Annual increase (mio)  0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 -0.9 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.2
Annual increase rate (%)  15.9 -9.0 10.2 13.2 22.1 2.7 18.9 20.3 10.6 6.4 -25.4 34.9 11.5 7.4 4.7
Exchange activities    45 68 32 30 40 45   
Taiwanese persons    1,200 2,100      
Academics, students,  
school administration    1,052 1,000 2,000 2,200  8,000
Taiwanese students    816 1,054 768 905 955 1,199 2,307 2,200
Exchange agreements  
between schools    10 20   100
Sources: MOE (CH) 2001 ff.; TAO 2008. 
Information about visits from Taiwan to China shows a constant increase with the exception 
of two years: 1994 and 2003. In 1994, Taiwanese tourists were killed in the Chinese province 
of Zhejiang, and 2003 was the year of the severe respiratory illness SARS. The constant in-
crease has been praised by both sides as a sign of successful public diplomacy and could be 
interpreted as a validation of the “higher education–internationalization hypothesis” rather 
than the “international relations hypothesis.” 
A closer look at the margins of increase, however, reveals that this conclusion might be too 
rash (Figure 2). Again we can see the steep decrease in 1994 and 2003, with absolute num-
bers and increase ratios following the same trend. But we can also see a decrease in 199833 
and—with the exception of 2004—lower increase rates after the inauguration of the Chen 
administration in the year 2000. 
Based on these numbers we could assume that political relations do have an impact on peo-
ple-to-people exchange. But I am hesitant to do this. Firstly, we do not know the composition 
of visits and the development for different groups such as tourists, business people or aca-
demics. Tourists’ visits in particular might vary or even decline when the initial excitement 
has dwindled and/or tourism demand has been met. Secondly, there might be economic rea-
sons, like economic slowdown in Taiwan, that caused people to cut travel budgets.34 And 
thirdly, we cannot clearly separate the tourism, political and academic interests of academics. 
                                                     
33  The reason for this is not clear; it could be a consequence of the Asian crises. In 1998 no new tensions existed 
in cross-Strait relations, and talks were resumed. President Lee Teng-hui redefined the relationship as a “spe-
cial state-to-state" one (tesu de guo yu guo guanxi) only on July 9, 1999. 
34  This argument could also work in the opposite way: Greene argues that with the standard of living continu-
ously improving, young peoples incentives to study abroad have diminished (Greene 2007:146). 
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Figure 2: Visits from Taiwan to China, Annual Comparison, 1992–2007 
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Source: See Table 2. 
In order to check the possible impact of economic development, we can examine the num-
bers regarding the visits of mainland academics to Taiwan (Figure 3). Budget considerations 
should not play a role for them since China has experienced double-digit growth for some 
years.35 These figures also show downturns in 1994 and 2003, as well as recovery in the fol-
lowing year. Furthermore, they show a decline in 1996 and 1997, when China switched to 
“missile diplomacy” to menace Taiwanese voters in the first free presidential election, and 
again in 1999 and 2000. The reasons for the latter two declines could have been President 
Lee’s policy switch to “special state-to-state” relations in July 1999 and/or the presidential 
elections in 2000. The next presidential elections in 2004, however, did not affect the recov-
ery after the SARS crisis. Nevertheless, growth rates in subsequent years never came close to 
those of 2001 and 2002. 
Budgetary problems may also derive from cutbacks in funding. Indeed, for the years since 
2001 the CDF yearbooks show lower levels of funds—and accordingly less applications ac-
cepted—compared to 1999 and 2000, although not in comparison to 1998. But funding has 
remained more or less at the same level from 2001 to 2005; only in 2006 did figures decline 
steeply (Figure 4). Differing from that pattern, cross-Strait exchange funded by NSC was 
lower in the years 2003/04, but in 2005 reached the level of 2002 again (Guokehui 2007:107 f.). 
Again we may assume that political relations affect academic exchange. 
                                                     
35  Chen Chih-jou, research fellow at Academia Sinica, has analyzed these figures in detail (Chen 2008). 
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Figure 3: Academic Visits from China to Taiwan, 1992–2007 
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Notes: Figures counting visits refer to “activities” (huodong), not to the status of persons (renshi). In contrast 
Chen (2008), I use these figures for all years from 1992 to 2007. “Cultural and academic exchange” refers 
to all types of exchange listed under this heading, whereas “academic exchange” adds up “academic ac-
tivities” (wenjiao huodong), “scientific activities” (xueshu keji huodong), and “scientific research activities” 
(xueshu keji yanjiu huodong). 
Source: MAC 2008. 
But even if academic exchange has been affected by political relations, which political action 
actually caused the change has to be investigated. Declines in the years of presidential elec-
tions in Taiwan can be traced to interference by the Chinese authorities, who restrict travels 
in politically sensitive times. According to MAC, this also holds true for the time between 
the Legislative Yuan election in January 2008 and the presidential election in March of the 
same year (personal interview).  
Statistics about applied for, approved and realized trips to Taiwan by mainland academics can 
help to get an idea of the magnitude of the number of trips refused. Chen explains in detail the 
procedures Chinese academics have to go through to obtain a travel permit. Comparing the 
number of applications approved by Taiwan and the lower quantity of real trips for the years 
from 2001 to 2007, he concludes that many academics have been prevented from traveling by 
Chinese authorities (Chen 2008:6 and Table 3). But this is only one part of the picture. By com-
paring applications and approvals we can see that even more trips have been refused by the 
Taiwanese authorities (particularly in the year of SARS, 2003) and that the amount of refusals 
increased during the second term of the Chen administration after 2004 (Table 3). 
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Figure 4: China Development Fund: Spending and Accepted Applications, 1994–2006 
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Note: For spending in 2000, the sum is estimated, since yearbooks only list the accumulated amount for the 
second half of 1999 and 2000. 
Source: DF 2000 ff. 
Table 3:  Rejected Applications Made by Mainland Academics, 2001–2007 
Difference between … 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Application and Approval (TW) 3,062 3,319 12,100 4,104 4,117 4,500 31,202 
Approved Trips and Real Trips (CH) 3,691 4,424 8,972 3,829 3,517 4,036 28,469 
TW Refusals Compared to CH rejections -0,629 -1,105 3,128 0,275 0,6 0,464 2,733 
Source: MAC, according to Chen 2008; author’s own calculations. 
As I said above, we cannot rule out the possibility that the rates of increase have been declin-
ing because of tourist demand now being met after several years of intensive traveling. In-
deed, all my interviews with academics support this view. They no longer accept any invita-
tion without considering its academic value added. 
Thus I would like to draw the following conclusion from this discussion: (1) Declining rates 
of increase for mutual visits might support the assumption that political relations affect 
people-to-people exchange in cross-Strait relations, but it is not clear whether this also holds 
true for academic exchange. (2) The claim of both governments that their public diplomacy 
strategy has proved to be a success refers to the state-sponsored activities of foundations. 
This state-centered approach narrows exchange to second-track organizations and neglects 
the mainly nonsponsored nonofficial exchange of individual researchers. Many of them con-
sequently complained, or better, stated resignedly, in my interviews that the government 
has no interest in that kind of exchange. (3) Declining nonacademic interest in cross-Strait 
academic exchange supports the trend of a normalization and professionalization of this 
special kind of academic communication. 
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3.5 The Professionalization of Cross-Strait Academic Exchange 
In all of the interviews respondents either talked about increasing professionalization in 
cross-Strait academic exchange or about future plans for professionalization. This holds true 
for colleges, individual researchers and foundations, in the medical sciences as well as the 
social sciences. 
Professionalization as used here refers to the academic “profession” and denotes an increas-
ing interest in 
(1) talking to or establishing contacts with persons in academic think tanks, 
(2) improving the academic quality of study trips or conferences, 
(3) going to China for the purpose of teaching or fieldwork, 
(4) organizing joint study programs or joint research with mainland partners. 
In addition to individual study tours, most activities still take place at the college level and 
mainly in the form of workshops or conferences. Chen and Chen report that 84 percent of 
their survey respondents took part in “visits,” 79 percent attended in conferences, 20 percent 
pursued fieldwork, 16 percent gave lectures, and no one stayed for an extended period as a 
visiting fellow (Chen and Chen 2005:55). Their results also show that the quality of academic 
exchange still has to be improved (ibid.: 70).36 In my own small sample of interviewees there 
were at least two who had been visiting lecturers on the mainland for one term, and reports 
from the faculty of the College of Commerce at Chengchi University indicate that some staff 
members have been transferred to Chinese universities for longer periods. 
Nevertheless, the pressure of internationalization as well as the marketization of higher edu-
cation—practically spoken: to produce more results that lead to positive evaluations—exert 
clear incentives to raise the professional quality of exchange. As mentioned above, the IIR 
has served as a second-track academic institution in cross-Strait relations and began organiz-
ing study trips shortly after they were made possible. At that time it seemed to be necessary 
to gain information about opinions and debates in China that were not brought forward in 
official communication. Although the IIR is still the number one address for delegations 
from the mainland, IIR fellows today concentrate on exchange with academic value added 
and the institute aims for joint research (Box 2). 
While it was downgraded during Chen’s presidency, the IIR’s expertise has gained prestige 
again since the KMT government took over in May 2008. Former and current researchers 
from the IIR have been given jobs in government agencies, and the institute’s cross-Strait 
networks are used to organize closed- and open-door discussions between experts from the 
mainland and Taiwan (personal interview). This, however, has not spared the institute from 
being evaluated according to “international” standards of academic excellence. 
                                                     
36  As a reminder, Chen and Chen surveyed specialists in China studies. 
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Box 2: The Institute of International Relations, Chengchi University 
The Institute of International Relations (IIR) is Taiwan’s largest research institution dedicated to the under-
standing of international issues. It was established on April 1, 1953 as a government think-tank to provide 
analysis to high-level government departments. IIR became officially affiliated with NCCU in July 1975, and 
is now under NCCU’s organizational umbrella. 
The director of the Institute oversees research staff divided into four main divisions. The First Division con-
ducts research on the international political and economic relations of North and South America, Europe, 
and Africa. The second Division covers similar topics in Asia, Oceania, and the Pacific Rim. The Third and 
Fourth Divisions focus on the affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It has 37 researchers (14 per-
manent, 12 associate and 11 assistant). 
IIR established relations with institution on the Mainland: China Institutes of Contemporary International Re-
lations, School of International Studies (SIS) of Peking University, Taiwan Study Centre at Beijing University. 
It concluded an cooperation agreement with Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
in order to promote mutual visits, exchange publication and material and to carry out research activities. 
From May 2006 to April 17, 2007 28 groups or individual researchers visited the IIR (laifang xuezhe), among 
them 8 groups/researchers from all parts of mainland China (Nanjing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Fujian, Xiamen, 
Guangdong, Beijing) and one from Hong Kong. Without giving dates, the webpage lists 14 exchange schol-
ars, among them seven from the mainland and two from Hong Kong. 
Source: http://iir.nccu.edu.tw/. 
Institutions as well as individual researchers (on both sides!) have found several ways to cir-
cumvent political interference or bureaucratic obstacles: 
• They do not use contested “names” and speak, for example, of “Zhongguo.Taipei” and 
“Zhongguo.Beijing”. 
• They find titles for conferences that can pass through bureaucratic barriers on both sides. 
• Mainland scholars offer courses under the name of a Taiwanese professor. 
• They avoid formal agreements in favor of informal and oral agreements.37 
• They go to the other country for short-term visits as tourists (mainlander via Hong Kong). 
• Both sides avoid raising sensitive issues. 
Consistent with this trend towards professionalization is the declining interest in “sightsee-
ing”-trips, as well as a growth of commercial activities. Interviewees in the medical field re-
sponded either that they have no interest in going to China because of the inadequate level 
of medical science there or that they would go to “sell” their expertise, for example, if they 
were paid by foreign companies to teach medical techniques.38 Other professions, such as in-
ternational law, are also welcomed by Chinese universities.39 The College of Commerce at 
Chengchi University, together with other institutions in Taipei including Academia Sinica, 
has organized a joint graduate teaching program at Xian Jiaotong Daxue as well as a joint 
EMBA course for Taiwanese businessmen in cooperation with Fudan University in Shang-
                                                     
37  According to TAO information, nearly 100 mainland universities have established exchange programs with 
Taiwanese counterparts (www.gwytb.gov.cn). 
38  Zhou states that, as has also been the case worldwide, the marketization of universities has been taking place 
in Taiwan since the middle of the 1980s (Zhou 2000). For cooperation in the natural sciences see Chen 2002. 
39  Wang indicates the interest on the part of mainland scholars to renew ties with Taiwanese historians (Edward 
Q. Wang 2008). 
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hai. It can thus combine experience on the mainland with degrees issued in Taiwan. Both ac-
tivities (and some others as well) are based on informal agreements. 
The interests of academics in professionalization thus range from genuine research to the 
marketization of their knowledge. The room for research on the mainland and for joint aca-
demic projects is constantly expanding since China’s political and economic systems, and 
particularly the latter, are in transition. Mainland scholars enjoy better education and increas-
ing personal freedom, something which is reflected in more openness and growing self-
confidence.40 The predominant form of exchange is still conferences, but this may also be true 
of academic exchange in general and worldwide since conferences bring together the largest 
groups of academics. Contacts and communication at the level of individual researchers are, 
however, increasing in number. Since this type of exchange is mainly nonofficial, there is no 
valid information available on it. However, all of my interviewees reported on this kind of 
exchange and presented examples of it as proof of their academic activities. 
In the future, the professionalization of exchange in the context of the internationalization of 
higher education might lead to further changes and also to a possible decline in cross-Strait 
communication, since fellows and institutions in China and Taiwan prefer to establish ties 
with top-notch colleges in the USA or elsewhere. So far, the common (Chinese) language still 
favors cross-Strait exchanges, but English language skills are also on the upswing in China. 
To summarize, I would like to visualize my findings by modifying Figure 1 as well as by us-
ing a diagram that relates the three layers of public diplomacy to types of academic exchange. 
Figure 5 shows the levels and actors of exchange as in the model presented above, due to 
asymmetrical information, however, less detailed for the Chinese side. Furthermore, it shows 
the decreasing intensity of political interference and bureaucratic restrictions from the state 
down to the community level. State sponsorship is concentrated on foundations, but profes-
sional associations, colleges and individual scholars are also able to benefit from these foun-
dations’ activities. There is less exchange at the university level because of the restrictions ex-
plained above, but more exchange at the level of foundations, colleges and scholars, whereby 
the latter seem to have more nonofficial than official contacts. Whereas endeavors to interna-
tionalize higher education can be found at all levels and the pressure to make things happen 
is also exerted in a bottom-up manner, public diplomacy is predominantly a top-down busi-
ness. The former, however, has social consequences—intended or not. Even without official 
approval, social actors serve as “public diplomats.”41 
In Figure 6, I place cross-Strait academic exchange in a diagram using my two-dimensional 
framework. As I explained in Section 2.1, three layers can be distinguished in public diplo-
macy (see Cowan and Arsenault 2008): monologue, dialogue and collaboration. Addition-
ally, in Section 2.2 I explained that educational exchange programs can be found on a con-
                                                     
40  “These changes have enabled ‘non-state’ actors to play a—still limited but increasing—role in diplomacy”, 
observed d'Hooghe (2007:10). 
41  Admittedly, these findings are partial and incomplete. The interviews were overwhelmingly conducted with 
political scientists from national universities in the north of Taiwan. The trend of professionalization as drawn 
as conclusion, however, might be even more prevalent in private universities being less restricted than the 
public ones. 
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tinuum from “loose models” such as visits through dialogue forms such as conferences to 
close collaboration in joint projects. Taking these two dimensions together, academic ex-
change as configured at the outset of cross-Strait exchanges can be placed in the square of 
loose monologue-based contacts. While official exchange programs have shifted slightly to-
wards more dialogue-based forms, nonsponsored nonofficial exchange has been moving 
even further towards collaborative projects. 
Figure 5: Cross-Strait Academic Exchange: Political Influence and the Level of Exchange 
 
Notes: CDF = China Development Fund 
HE = higher education 
MAC = Mainland Affairs Council 
MOE = Ministry of Education 
MOFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MOI = Ministry of the Interior 
NIA = National Immigration Agency 
NSC = National Science Council 
TAO = Taiwan Affairs Office 
(1) red = political influence/restrictions (width = intensity) 
(2) blue = exchange (width = intensity; continuous line = official exchange; dashed line = official and non- 
      official exchange 
(3) green = sponsorship 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Figure 6:  Cross-Strait Academic Exchange in the Two-dimensional Framework of Public 
Diplomacy and Transnational Educational Contacts 
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4 Final Remarks 
In my view, any researcher trying to determine the real power of “soft power” in interna-
tional relations is confronted with a problem. Soft power is a resource at anyone’s com-
mand; it works for any country and in any direction. China, for example, wants to exert it by 
sending and absorbing students and academics, by teaching Chinese and learning English, 
by organizing conferences and sending academics on study trips. Taiwan wants the same. 
What, however, does this mean for a Chinese or Taiwanese academic visiting or working in 
the other country? Is he or she an actor or a target of soft power? 
Speaking about the demand to recognize educational credentials from Chinese universities, 
former president Chen declared, “Once this door is opened, even if only slightly, we will 
have to relax an increasing number of policies and it will become impossible for us to close 
the door in future” (Taipei Times, 22.07.2007). In contrast, President Ma Ying-jeou, inaugu-
rated in May 2008, explained in an exclusive interview with China News Agency that his 
support for Taiwanese recognition of diplomas issued by Chinese universities would help 
Taiwan to utilize its “soft strengths.” Recognizing Chinese degrees would lead to a greater 
number of Chinese students studying in Taiwan: “‘When these young people … return 
home, they will become some of Taiwan’s best friends,’ he said. ‘Allowing more young Chi-
nese to understand that Taiwan is a model worth learning from instead of a place that 
should be attacked is probably a better way of ensuring Taiwan's security than boosting the 
nation's defense spending,’” (CNA, 05.04.2008). 
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Joseph Nye has advised against seeing public diplomacy simply in adversarial terms: “Some-
times there is a competition of ‘my information versus your information,’ but often there can 
be gains for both sides” (Nye Jr. 2008:106). The answer to the question of how a government 
should exert soft power, that is, how it should design its public diplomacy, is—as we can 
see—not that easy. However, one important aspect is certainly the degree of trust a govern-
ment has in the persuasive power of its own system and in its own people. This means that the 
Taiwanese government would be ill-advised to rely on state-sponsored academic exchange 
only. The strength of public diplomacy becomes apparent only in the long run. Gradually it 
will influence the public environment, in which opinions are formed, in other societies. 
Public diplomacy is primarily the interaction between nongovernmental individuals and/or 
organizations, with private views presented in addition to government views. “Government 
communications are only a small fraction of the total communications among societies” 
(Nye Jr. 2008:104). The most effective form of public diplomacy is exchanges, since they in-
volve listening as well as talking and help to build lasting relationships (ibid.). Moreover, 
the professionalization of cross-Strait academic exchange will not weaken but will rather 
strengthen the “soft power” of Taiwan’s higher education system and its constituents by 
broadening its international horizons and improving its quality. 
Former president Chen disregarded the role of academics in his public diplomacy strategy. 
Academics therefore “retreated” into their own profession and expanded academic ex-
change through different channels: formal-institutional, informal-private, and commercial. 
The presidential elections in Taiwan in March 2008 opened up a new chapter in cross-Strait 
academic exchange. President Ma Ying-jeou has clearly stated his aim of promoting cross-
Strait exchange. In the first year of his presidency, visas for Chinese students coming to Tai-
wan for short-term research or study have been extended from four months to one year. 
Three other goals for the expansion of cross-Strait academic exchanges are the extended en-
rollment of Chinese students at Taiwanese universities, the recognition of diplomas from 
Chinese universities, and the authorization for local universities to offer continuing educa-
tion and degree programs in China (Taipei Times, 22.10.2008, 17.12.2008). The Taiwanese 
deputy minister of education described these measures as “a segment of greater communi-
cation across the Taiwan Strait” (China Post, 24.09.2008). 
President Ma has announced a shift in emphasis from “high politics” to “low politics” as part 
of a new direction for his administration’s “flexible diplomacy” (China Post, 06.02.2009). He 
has begun to “re-diplomatize” academic exchange. It remains to be seen whether he will actu-
ally tap the full potential of already established bottom-up cross-Strait contacts and include 
societal actors in his soft-power and public-diplomacy strategy. The “professionalization” of 
cross-Strait academic exchange has to some extent resulted from the disregard of genuine aca-
demic communication by the Chen administration, but it is not contradictory to public diplo-
macy. On the contrary, intensified academic exchange can be a building block in the gradual 
improvement of cross-Strait relations. 
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